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ERISA PREEMPTION AND PATIENTS' RIGHTS IN
THE WAKE OF AETNA HEALTH INC. V. DAVILA
Kelly M. Loud'
When Gwen Roark was bitten by a brown recluse spider in 1990, the
bite damaged the skin, muscle, and bone of her left leg, necessitating
antibiotics, skin grafting procedures, and several surgeries.' Gwen was
required to wear a vacuum-assisted closure device (VAC) twenty-two
hours a day in order to quicken the healing process and a nurse was hired
to treat Gwen's wound on a daily basis.2 These treatments were
recommended by Gwen's doctor, who considered all the treatments to be
medically necessary. When Humana Health Plan (Humana), the
Roarks' health maintenance organization (HMO), refused to pay for the
VAC and the home visits, Gwen's treatment stopped for a month despite
warnings by her doctor that a discontinuation of treatment could result in
Gwen losing her leg.4 During this month, the wound developed into a
serious infection, and Gwen's leg had to be amputated.5 After the
amputation, Humana continued to deny coverage for the VAC
6
treatment, again ignoring the recommendations of Gwen's doctors.
Sadly, her condition worsened and she was required to undergo a second
amputation treatment
The Roarks filed a lawsuit against Humana in a Texas state court
alleging negligence and failure to exercise ordinary care; however, their
claims were dismissed as being completely preempted by the Employee
B.A., Biology, Colgate University; J.D. Candidate, May 2006, The Catholic University of
America, Columbus School of Law. The author wishes to thank Lisa Campbell and Jill
Keblawi for their guidance throughout the writing process, and her parents, Karen and
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1. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 303-04 (5th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom.
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004). Roark was an appeal of a remand
order; the Roarks' claim was preempted by ERISA, and the Roarks failed to amend their
complaint to bring a suit under section 502(a). Id. at 304. In Roark, the court held that
two of the four plaintiffs in a consolidated action could sue their health maintenance
organization (HMO) for malpractice under state law. See id. at 308-09. However, this
holding was reversed by Davila. 124 S.Ct. at 2502.
2. Roark, 307 F.3d at 303.
3 Id.
4. Id.
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Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).s  ERISA has no
provisions for a negligence action9 and the Roarks declined the
opportunity to replead under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions.0
ERISA governs employee welfare benefit plans, including health plans
like the Roarks'." Under ERISA, a participant or beneficiary of a health
plan may sue "to recover benefits due to him under the terms of the plan,
to enforce his rights under the terms of his plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan.",12 ERISA also allows an
aggrieved participant or beneficiary to seek "appropriate equitable
relief" under § 502(a)(3);'3 however, the courts, including the Supreme
Court, have severely limited this remedy. 4 Participants and beneficiaries
are thus limited to contract-like benefit claims.'" This remedial scheme
precludes other claims for compensatory or punitive damages, claims of
personal injury, and wrongful death actions. 16 For Gwen Roark, this
8. Id. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No., 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.).
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).
10. Roark, 307 F.3d at 304.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (2000). This section provides:
[T]his subchapter shall apply to any employee benefit plan if it is established or
maintained-
(1) by any employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity
affecting commerce; or
(2) by any employee organization or organizations representing employees
engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; or
(3) by both.
Id.
HMOs, preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and other types of managed
care organizations (MCOs) are not "health plans" per se, but are service providers or
"health insurance issuers." See Phyllis C. Borzi, ERISA and Employer-Sponsored Group
Health Plans, in HEALTH AND WELFARE BENEFIT PLANS: THE PRESSURE IS ON 1-2
(2003). ERISA defines "health insurance issuer" as
an insurance company, insurance service, or insurance organization (including
[an HMO] .. .) which is licensed to engage in the business of insurance in a State
and which is subject to State law which regulates insurance (within the meaning
of section 1144(b)(2) of this title). Such term does not include a group health
plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1191b(b)(2) (2000). If a service provider engages in acts of plan
administration, it assumes a fiduciary role under ERISA. See infra notes 35-36 and
accompanying text.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B) (2000).
13. Id. § 1132 (a)(3).
14. See infra note 40.
15. See, e.g., Vargas v. Child Dev. Council of Franklin County, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 2d
954, 956-58 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (noting that extracontractual and punitive damages are not
available under section 502(a)( 3 ) of ERISA).
16. Id. at 956-57; see Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 260-62 (1993) (holding
that a plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory damages under ERISA section 502(a));
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means she can sue to recover the cost of the VAC treatment and perhaps
the cost of the nurses' visits, but cannot seek redress or compensation for
the tragic loss of her limb.
17
The unfortunate reality of the managed care industry is that managed
care companies seek to reduce their costs in a market where health care
costs are rising faster than the inflation rate, and in order to do so they
must pay out as few benefits as possible. 8 A health plan participant or
beneficiary in need of a medication or other treatment must submit her
claim to her HMO or insurer, which will conduct a "utilization review" to
determine the "medical necessity" of the benefit requested.' 9 Services
that the HMO determines to be medically unnecessary are denied
through this process and thus are not covered by the HMO. 0 If the claim
is denied, a participant must engage in an administrative process to
appeal the HMO's decision, even when the need for the treatment is
urgent and any delay may prove injurious or sometimes fatal.2' The
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (holding that ERISA does not
allow for punitive or compensatory damages for injuries arising from a plan's failure to
provide benefits due to a participant); Cicio v. Does, 385 F.3d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 2004)
(affirming trial court's dismissal of state law medical malpractice claim that sought
compensation beyond value of benefit denied, including consequential and punitive
damages); Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1335, 1339 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that tort actions for wrongful death and emotional distress were preempted by
ERISA, and money damages for emotional distress were not available under ERISA).
17. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. A court in its discretion may award
attorney's fees to a successful participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1)
(2000). Were Gwen a participant in a non-ERISA plan such as a managed Medicaid plan,
she would be free to seek legal redress against her HMO. See Jones v. Chi. HMO Ltd. of
Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1128 (I11. 2000) (holding that a Medicaid recipient could hold her
HMO liable for institutional negligence). Participants in government health plans, church
health plans, and people who purchase individual health plans for themselves and their
beneficiaries, are not subject to the remedial constraints imposed by ERISA. See 29
U.S.C. § 1003 (2000).
18. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 219-20 (2000) (comparing HMOs with
other risk-bearing organizations and discussing measures taken by HMOs to control
costs); Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How To Fix It:
Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 462-63 (2003) (noting that
MCOs have financial incentives to "underprovide rather than overprovide" healthcare
services and coverage).
19. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 219-20 (discussing system of utilization review); Korobkin,
supra note 18, at 463-64 (discussing utilization review procedures as a measure to control
the provision of hcalthcare services).
20. Korobkin, supra note 18, at 494.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2000). ERISA section 503 requires employee benefit plans to
set up a claims-processing procedure whereby a participant's claim for a benefit receives a
"full and fair review." Id.
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary, every employee benefit plan
shall -
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Department of Labor has established claims regulations that require
expedited review for "urgent" claims, requiring that an HMO or insurer
provide the participant or beneficiary with notification of its denial (or
22
approval) of a claim within seventy-two hours of submission.
(1) provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary
whose claim for benefits under the plan has been denied, setting forth the
specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calculated to be understood
by the participant, and
(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for
benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named
fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.
Id. Should the claim be denied, regulations issued by the Department of Labor set
guidelines for appeals procedures for group health plans, providing for a 180 day period
within which the participant may appeal a denied claim, and a subsequent thirty day
period in which the plan must respond to the appeal. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(3)(i), .503-
l(h)(4) (2003).
22. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(f)(2)(i) (2003).
(e) Claim for benefits. For purposes of this section, a claim for benefits is a
request for a plan benefit or benefits made by a claimant in accordance with a
plan's reasonable procedure for filing benefit claims. In the case of a group
health plan, a claim for benefits includes any pre-service claims ... and any post-
service claims ....
(f) Timing of notification of benefit determination. (1) In general .... [I]f a
claim is wholly or partially denied, the plan administrator shall notify the
claimant . . . of the plan's adverse benefit determination within a reasonable
period of time, but not later than 90 days after receipt of the claim by the plan,
unless the plan administrator determines that special circumstances require an
extension of time for processing the claim. If the plan administrator determines
that an extension of time for processing is required, written notice of the
extension shall be furnished to the claimant prior to the termination of the initial
90-day period....
(2) Group health plans. In the case of a group health plan, the plan
administrator shall notify a claimant of the plan's benefit determination ....
(i) Urgent care claims. In the case of a claim involving urgent care, the plan
administrator shall notify the claimant of the plan's benefit determination
(whether adverse or not) as soon as possible, taking into account the medical
exigencies, but not later than 72 hours after receipt of the claim by the plan,
unless the claimant fails to provide sufficient information to determine whether,
or to what extent, benefits are covered or payable under the plan. In the case of
such a failure, the plan administrator shall notify the claimant as soon as possible,
but not later than 24 hours after receipt of the claim by the plan, of the specific
information necessary to complete the claim .... The plan administrator shall
notify the claimant of the plan's benefit determination as soon as possible, but in
no case later than 48 hours after the earlier of-
(A) The plan's receipt of the specified information, or
(B) The end of the period afforded the claimant to provide the specified
additional information.
Id. § 2560.503-1(e) to -(f)(1)(i) (sixth emphasis added). Most courts require a participant
or beneficiary to exhaust his or her insurer's or HMO's internal claims procedures before
seeking adjudicative relief. Borzi, supra note 11, at 19.
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The Roarks' case is by no means rare, and for years similar cases have
been the subject of discussion among lawmakers)3 With increasing
frequency, state legislatures attempt to fill ERISA's remedial void by
adding laws that attempt to provide more fairness to participants and
24beneficiaries in group health plans. However, in its October 2003 Term,
the Supreme Court declared in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila2 5 that any
attempts to supplement causes of action or remedies available under
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions will fail, as such laws are
26
completely preempted by federal law. Thus, the issue now becomes
how to provide greater protections for participants and beneficiaries in
group health plans, and more importantly, how to implement such
protections in a way that does not conflict with ERISA's preemptive
27
scope.
This Comment first examines the history of the enactment of ERISA
as it pertains to health care benefit plans. Next, this Comment traces the
Supreme Court's evolving interpretation of ERISA's preemptive
language, from the first case brought under its civil enforcement
provisions to its current jurisprudence of complete preemption of certain
causes of action. Next, this Comment discusses the types of claims that
the courts have stated will not be preempted by ERISA. This Comment
then analyzes the opinions set forth in Davila as calling upon Congress to
remedy the injustice that flows from ERISA's limited remedial scheme.
23. See David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed Care: What's Wrong with a Patient Bill
of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221, 237-40 [hereinafter Hyman, Managed Care] (discussing
how congressional debates during the 105th and 106th Congresses have focused heavily on
managed care "horror stories" as evidence of the need for a patient bill of rights); see also
David A. Hyman, Consumer Protection in a Managed Care World: Should Consumers Call
911?, 43 VILL. L. REV. 409, 410-11, 414 (1998); Excerpts from Debate on Lawsuits over
Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1999, at A14.
24. See Gail B. Agrawal & Mark A. Hall, What If You Could Sue Your HMO?
Managed Care Liability Beyond the ERISA Shield, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 235, 236 (2003)
(noting that states are making attempts to pass laws that will evade preemption and
impose liability on managed care organizations). Several states have passed laws that
imposed liability on MCOs. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-3153 (West 2002); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3428 (West Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-48 (2000); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 22:3085 (West Supp. 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4313 (West Supp.
2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-33 (West Supp. 2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 6593
(West Supp. 2004); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002 (Vernon Supp. 2004);
see also PATRICIA BUTLER, UPDATE - 2001: ERISA PREEMPTION MANUAL FOR STATE
HEALTH POLICY MAKERS 11 n.39 (2001), available at http://www.nashp.org/Files/
GNL30_ERISAPreemption manual.pdf.
25. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).
26. Id. at 2492, 2502 (holding that claims brought pursuant to the Texas Health Care
Liability Act (THCLA) were completely preempted by ERISA).
27. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 377 (2002) (noting that
state insurance laws "lose out" if found to conflict with ERISA).
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This Comment next assesses the viability of several avenues that
Congress, the courts, or plaintiffs' attorneys may take to protect
participants or their beneficiaries from any injury they may sustain due to
a wrongful denial of benefits. Finally, this Comment argues that patients'
rights will best be served if the Federal Government works within the
framework of ERISA, drafting a Patients' Bill of Rights that targets
practices and mechanisms used by HMOs in their review of medical
benefits claims, and more specifically, provides participants and
beneficiaries with a right to external and independent medical review of
adverse benefit determinations.
I. WHERE WE CAME FROM AND How WE GOT HERE
A. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
Congress enacted ERISA in response to reported fraud and
mismanagement of employee pension funds.2 and at its inception the
statute was aimed at regulating pension plans." The law's stated purpose
was to "protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . . by establishing
standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of
employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies,
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal Courts., 30  Over the years,
Congress expanded the scope of ERISA to cover health insurance and
health benefits. 31 Today, ERISA applies to employee welfare benefit
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000).
[D]espite the enormous growth in such plans many employees with long years of
employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the tack of
vesting provisions in such plans; that owing to the inadequacy of current
minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with respect to
adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered; that owing to the
termination of plans before requisite funds have been accumulated, employees
and their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated benefits ....
Id.; see also Introductory Remarks of Mr. Ribicoff, reprinted in 1 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR
OF THE COMM. ON LABOR & PUB. WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EMPLOYMENT RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 207-09 (2000); Thomas
W. Jennings et al., Introduction, in ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE §§ 1.01-02 (Paul J.
Schneider & Barbara W. Freedman eds., 2d ed. 2003).
29. Jennings et al.,supra note 28, § 1.01.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000).
31. See generally id. §§ 1161-1185(b). The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), id. §§ 1181-1187, and the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, id. §§ 1161-1169, expanded the scope of ERISA into
the healthcare arena. See Jennings et al., supra note 28, §§ 1.01, 1.06. However, unlike its
regulation of pension plans, Congress did not impose vesting requirements on health and
welfare benefit plans for fear that doing so "would seriously complicate the administration
1044
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plans maintained by an employer for the purpose of providing health
benefits.32
Section 402(a) of ERISA mandates that every employee welfare
benefit plan name a fiduciary to oversee the plan, and often this is the
plan administrator." A plan fiduciary has certain duties under ERISA.34
In addition to the plan administrator, other persons or organizations
involved with an employee welfare benefit plan may also be considered
fiduciaries if they exercise discretion over plan administration.- HMOs
are considered ERISA fiduciaries to the extent that HMOs make
administrative decisions about which health benefits an ERISA-plan
and increase the cost of plans whose primary function is to provide retirement income."
See H.R. REP. No. 93-807, at 60 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4726.
32. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1), 1003(a) (2000).
33. Id. § 1102(a). The statute requires:
(1) Every employee benefit plan shall be established and maintained
pursuant to a written instrument. Such instrument shall provide for one or more
named fiduciaries who jointly or severally shall have authority to control and
manage the operation and administration of the plan.
(2) For purposes of this subchapter, the term "named fiduciary" means a
fiduciary who is named in the plan instrument, or who, pursuant to a procedure
specified in the plan, is identified as a fiduciary (A) by a person who is an
employer or employee organization with respect to the plan or (B) by such an
employer and such an employee organization acting jointly.
Id.
34. Id. § 1104(a)(1). The statute reads:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries and-
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of
large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of
this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter.
Id.
35. See id. § 1002(21)(A). ERISA specifically provides a test to determine fiduciary
status:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any
discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any
authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he
renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation. . . or, (iii) he has any
discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of
such plan.
Id.; see also Borzi, supra note 11, at 10-11.
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participant or beneficiary will receive. Thus, when a participant or
beneficiary is denied benefits to which she feels that she is entitled, and
such denial was a breach of the fiduciary duty owed to her, she may bring
a suit against her HMO, the ultimate arbiter of the coverage decision,
under ERISA.37
1. The Civil Enforcement Provisions
ERISA expressly provides a plan participant or beneficiary with a
menu of remedies under its civil enforcement provisions. 3  Section
502(a)(1)(B) provides:
A civil action may be brought-
(1) by a participant or beneficiary-
(B) to recover benefits due to [the participant] under the
terms of his plan, to enforce [the participant's or beneficiary's]
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify [the participant's
or beneficiary's] rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan.39
36. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2502 (2004) ("When administering
employee benefit plans, HMOs must make discretionary decisions regarding eligibility for
plan benefits, and, in this regard, must be treated as plan fiduciaries."); Pegram v.
Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 223 (2000) ("[A]lthough [the HMO] is not an ERISA fiduciary
merely because it administers or exercises discretionary authority over its own HMO
business, it may still be a fiduciary if it administers the plan.").
37. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2000). ERISA section 502(a)(2) allows a plan
participant or beneficiary to sue "for appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title."
Id. Section 1109(a) in turn provides:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this
subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the
plan resulting from each such breach . . . and shall be subject to such other
equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate ....
Id. § 1109(a). Damages awarded for breach of fiduciary duty are awarded to the plan. Id.
38. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (b)(1)(B). A "participant" in an ERISA-governed plan is
any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former
member of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a
benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of
such employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be
eligible to receive any such benefit.
Id. § 1002(7). The Supreme Court expanded upon this definition to include employees in
currently covered employment, former employees with a reasonable expectation of
returning to current employment, and former employees with a colorable claim for vested
benefits. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 117-18 (1989). State
and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over suits arising under section
502(a)(1)(B). 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (2000).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
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Also relevant to participants and beneficiaries seeking relief for benefits
denied is section 502(a)(3), which allows for
a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable
relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.4 °
Thus, the statute expressly allows a participant or beneficiary to seek
recovery for benefits due, or to obtain some form of "equitable relief.",
4
1
The most frequently invoked provision within ERISA section 502 is the
action to recover benefits due, which can either be brought as an action
for reimbursement, or as an action seeking precertification for a certain
treatment or benefit 2
2. ERISA Section 514-Preemption and the Savings Clause
ERISA's preemption clause, section 514(a), states that ERISA "shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they . . . relate to any
employee benefit plan., 43 Certain laws are excepted from preemption
40. Id. § 1132(a)(3) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has read this provision
very narrowly, holding in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248 (1993), that Congress
intended the term "appropriate equitable relief" only to refer to "those categories of relief
that were typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but
not compensatory damages)," id. at 256-58. The Court further narrowed "equitable
relief" in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002),
where Justice Scalia limited the remedy of restitution to only those cases where an action
does not seek "to impose personal liability on the defendant" but instead seeks "to restore
to the plaintiff particular funds or property in the defendant's possession," id. at 214.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(3)(B) (2000).
42. See DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 449 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating
that a plaintiff could have paid for the benefit himself, then sought reimbursement); Marro
v. K-IlI Communications Corp., 943 F. Supp. 247, 248, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting a
preliminary injunction to plaintiff and ordering plaintiff's group health plan to precertify
requested high dosage chemotherapy treatment); Kekis v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Utica-Watertown, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 571, 585 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (granting preliminary
injunction requiring coverage for high dose chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow
transplantation treatment for patient with breast cancer). A section 502(a)(1)(B) cause of
action to recover benefits wrongfully denied is "to be reviewed under a de novo standard"
by the court unless the plan documents explicitly state that the plan administrator or
fiduciary has discretionary authority to decide benefits claims or construe the terms of the
plan, in which case benefits decisions will be reviewed under a more deferential standard.
Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
43. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) (emphasis added). ERISA's preemptive scope is
extremely broad. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 463 U.S. 85, 98-99 (1983) (discussing
drafting of preemptive language); see also THOMAS H. LAWRENCE & JOHN M. RUSSELL,
ERISA SUBROGATION: ENFORCING RECOUPMENT PROVISIONS IN ERISA-COVERED
HEALTH AND DISABILITY PLANS 47-48 (2000) (describing the initial judicial response to
the preemption clause). A state law "relates to" an employee welfare benefit plan "if it
20051 1047
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under the savings clause in section 514(b)(2)(A), which applies to "any
law of any State which regulates insurance, banking or securities.,
44
Thus, while a state law that regulates an HMO may "relate to" an
employee benefit plan, the law may also "regulate insurance" and
therefore may be saved from preemption.5  A final application of
has a connection with or reference to such a plan." Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97. Despite this
broad language, the reach of section 514 and its "relate to" language is not limitless. N.Y.
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,
659-60 (1995) (holding that a New York law requiring hospitals to collect surcharges and
HMOs involved with ERISA-governed plans did not "relate to" an ERISA plan because
it involved an area of traditional state regulation and did not "bind plan administrators to
any particular choice" or "preclude uniform administrative practice"). Furthermore,
certain plans are exempted from ERISA under § 1003(b), such as government plans and
church plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2000).
An action is removable to federal court "if (1) the cause of action is based on a
state law that is preempted by ERISA [conflict preemption], and (2) the cause of action is
'within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions' of ERISA § 502(a) [triggering
complete preemption]." Romney v. Lin, 94 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Metro. Life
Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64-66 (1987)). Thus, preemption under ERISA section 514
is not sufficient to support removal to federal court, but it may be raised as a defense to a
state law cause of action. Id. at 78.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). Until 2003, courts used a
two-pronged test to determine whether a state law regulated insurance for purposes of the
savings clause, focusing on (1) the "common sense" view of insurance, and (2) McCarran-
Ferguson Act factors (risk-spreading among insureds, integral part of policy relationship
between insured and insurer, and limited to insurance industry). See, e.g., Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 365-66, 373 (2002) (applying this test to determine that
a state law regulating independent medical review mechanisms did in fact regulate
insurance for purposes of the savings clause).
In Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003), the Supreme
Court crafted a new test to be used in determining whether a state law "regulates
insurance" for the purpose of the savings clause, id. at 341-42. The state law must (1) "be
specifically directed towards entities engaged in insurance," and (2) have a substantial
affect on the "risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured." Id.; see also
Elliot v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that under the
Miller test, state laws may be deemed to "regulate insurance" in a greater number of
instances than earlier Supreme Court case law suggested).
Stated another way, state laws must "home[] in on the insurance industry."
UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358, 368 (1999); see Kidneigh v. UNUM
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 345 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that the savings
clause did not apply to a Colorado bad faith cause of action against an ERISA provider
because it failed to satisfy the second "risk pooling" prong of the test); Nguyen v.
Healthguard of Lancaster, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 2d 296, 303, 306 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (finding that
although a Pennsylvania bad faith insurance statute was directed at the insurance industry,
it did not alter the risk pooling arrangement between insurer and insured, and thus did not
satisfy the second prong of the Miller test). But see Stone v. Disability Mgmt. Servs., Inc.,
288 F. Supp. 2d 684, 692-95 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (finding that a Pennsylvania bad faith
insurance statute satisfied both prongs of the Miller test, and did affect the risk pooling
arrangement between insurer and insured).
45. See Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 359, 365-68. The "deemer clause" provides that
a state may not "deem" ERISA plans to be insurers for the purpose of saving laws
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ERISA preemption analysis asks whether a state insurance law that falls
within the savings clause will nevertheless be preempted because it
conflicts with the policy of exclusive federal remedies embodied in
ERISA.n6
Though section 514 serves to preempt all laws that "relate to" an
employee benefit plan, 7 the civil enforcement provisions of section
502(a) carry an even stronger preemptive power. 4s An action brought
pursuant to a state law that provides remedies in excess of those
provided for in section 502(a), or an action brought under a state law that
could have been brought under section 502(a) will not be saved by
section 514(b)(2)(A), regardless of its relation to insurance .
B. Complete and Conflict Preemption and ERISA's Civil Enforcement
Provisions
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate that "any civil action
brought in a State court of which district courts have original jurisdiction,
may be removed by the defendant" to federal court.0 Federal courts
have original jurisdiction over questions that "aris[e] under the
regulating such plans from federal preemption. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2000). In
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990), the Supreme Court applied the deemer clause
to a Pennsylvania anti-subrogation law which "related to" a self-funded welfare plan that
was arguably "saved" because it regulated insurance, but ultimately was preempted under
the deemer clause because the state law applied to a plan that was not insured, id. at 58-61,
65.
The deemer clause also prohibits states from regulating self-funded health plans
as insurers. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). The Court in Rush Prudential held that an HMO
is both a heath care provider and an insurer, because HMOs in practice "underwrite and
spread risk among their participants." 536 U.S. at 367; see also Holliday, 498 U.S. at 61
(stating that as a result of the deemer clause, "self-funded ERISA plans are exempt from
state regulation insofar as that regulation 'relate[s] to' the plans" (alteration in original)).
46. See Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 367.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
48. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2496 (2004); see also discussion infra
Part II.
49. E.g., Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2495 (holding that plaintiffs' state law claims for
compensatory damages were preempted by ERISA because the state law provided for
remedies additional to those in ERISA's civil enforcement provisions); Metro. Life Ins. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1987) (holding that ERISA's civil enforcement provisions
displaced a state law cause of action to recover benefits wrongfully denied, characterizing
the state law action as a federal claim); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57
(1987) (holding that a state law is preempted because it provides for remedies in excess of
those provided in ERISA's civil enforcement provisions). The preemption at issue in Pilot
Life and Davila involved conflict preemption. See discussion infra Part I.B. The
preemption at issue in Taylor involved complete preemption. See discussion infra Part
I.B.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000).
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Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."5 The "well-pleaded
complaint" rule dictates that a cause of action "arises under" federal law
when the plaintiff's complaint raises issues of federal law. 2 When federal
preemption is raised solely as a defense to a plaintiff's suit, and a federal
question does not appear "upon the face of the complaint," a defendant
may not remove the case to federal court 3  Two additional types of
preemption relevant to ERISA preemption analysis are complete andconflct • 54
conflict preemption.
Complete preemption, an exception to the "well-pleaded-complaint
rule,"55 occurs where "a federal statute's preemptive force [is] so
extraordinary and all-encompassing that it converts an ordinary state-
common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of
the well-pleaded-complaint rule. 5 6 Under complete preemption, a state
law cause of action that falls within the scope of a federal statute with
such preemptive force is removable to federal court and will be dismissed
unless a plaintiff re-pleads under the controlling federal law.57
The Supreme Court applied the doctrine of complete preemption to
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions in Metropolitan Life Insurance v.
Taylor,58 stating that ERISA's civil enforcement provisions carried
"extraordinary preemptive power."5 9 The Court in Metropolitan Life
held that all state-law suits brought to enforce benefit rights against an
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
52. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 114 (1936).
53. Id. at 113.
54. See supra notes 55, 62-63 and accompanying text (discussing doctrines of
complete and conflict preemption).
55. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003).
56. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 303 (8th ed. 2004). The Seventh Circuit in Jass v.
Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996), set forth several factors
that should be considered when determining whether removal is proper based upon
complete preemption:
(1) whether the "plaintiff is eligible to bring a claim under [ERISA § 502(a)]";
(2) whether the plaintiff's "cause of action falls within the scope of an ERISA
provision that the plaintiff can enforce via § 502(a)"; and (3) whether the
plaintiff's "state law claim cannot be resolved without [looking to an ERISA-
governed contract],"
id. at 1487 (quoting Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995)). Indeed, any suit brought
by an ERISA plan participant to "enforce his rights" to a certain benefit should be
completely preempted when his claim "cannot be resolved without an interpretation of the
contract governed by federal law." Rice, 65 F.3d at 644.
57. Anderson, 539 U.S. at 8 ("When the federal statute completely pre-empts the
state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action,
even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law."); DiFelice v.
Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2003).
58. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
59. Id. 63-66.
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ERISA-governed plan are wholly displaced by section 502(a)(1)(B) and
will be characterized as actions arising under federal law.6°
Under the doctrine of conflict preemption, a state law is preempted if
it conflicts with the "provisions and objectives" of a federal law. 6' The
Supreme Court applied the doctrine of conflict preemption in Pilot Life
Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux62 to causes of action falling within the scope of
ERISA section 502(a). 63 In this case, the Court noted that the section
502(a) remedial scheme was carefully designed to be comprehensive, and
intended to maintain a balance between "the need for prompt and fair
claims settlement" and "the public interest in encouraging the formation
of employee benefit plans. '64 Thus, certain remedies were excluded to
comport with this balancing test, and allowing ERISA-plan participants
and beneficiaries to obtain other remedies under state law would
undermine congressional intent.65 In other words, additional remedies
not provided for in ERISA ultimately conflict with ERISA's remedial
scheme and Congress' intent to keep such a scheme exclusive.
6
Having laid the foundation for complete and conflict preemption as
applied to ERISA's civil enforcement provisions, the courts subsequently
60. Id. at 66-67. Complete preemption also applies to § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA), which the court found to carry "preemptive force
... so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization." Id. (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v.
Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983)). In determining
whether ERISA section 502(a) claims give rise to complete preemption, the Court in
Taylor compared language within the jurisdictional subsection of section 502 to that of
LMRA section 301 and found the language to be similar. Metro. Life Ins. v. Taylor, 481
U.S. 58, 65 (1987). The Court drew additional support from a House conference report
describing ERISA section 502(a), which states: "'All such actions [to enforce benefit rights
under the plan or to recover benefits] in Federal or State courts are to be regarded as
arising under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those brought under
section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947."' Id. at 65-66 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 327 (1974)).
61. See, e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 844 (1997) (holding that a state law that
"undermined[] the purpose" of ERISA "cannot stand," and that states may not "change
ERISA's structure and balance").
62. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
63. Id. 54-56.
64. Id. at 54.
65. Id.
66. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985) ("[Tlhe six carefully
integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a) of [ERISA] as finally enacted...
provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it
simply forgot to incorporate expressly."). Contra Franklin H. Williams Ins. Trust v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that "it would be quixotic to
rule that a claim under a state statute that is saved from ERISA preemption . . .may
nonetheless be enforced only via ERISA's provisions and remedies").
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defined which kinds of claims would fall victim to these types of ERISA
preemption, and which claims may escape.67
C. Certain Claims Escape the Preemptive Power of ERISA: The Quality-
Quantity Distinction
In Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,8 the Third Circuit held that claims
attacking the quality of benefits received fall outside the preemptive
scope of ERISA section 502(a).69  In Dukes, the participant sought a
blood test as suggested by his primary care physician.70 The participant
sought treatment in a hospital that refused to perform the test, so the
participant was forced to seek treatment elsewhere.7 Due to the delay in
receiving the blood test, the participant's dangerously high blood sugar
went unnoticed, and he died from related causes." The participant's wife
brought a lawsuit in state court against the couple's HMO, alleging that it
was vicariously liable for the negligence of its providers, and that the
HMO itself was negligent in "fail[ing] to exercise reasonable care in
selecting, retaining, screening, monitoring, and evaluating the personnel
who actually provided the medical services."73
The HMO argued for removal to federal court under the complete
preemption doctrine. 4 After the district court denied the Dukes' motion
to remand to state court, the Third Circuit stated that the participant's
claims attacked the quality of benefits received rather than the actual
receipt of the benefits and, therefore, the plaintiff's claim was distinct
67. See DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 446 ("We have had numerous occasions to consider the
question of whether a plaintiff's claim against an HMO is covered by section 502(a) and is
therefore completely preempted. Determining whether a claim could have been brought
under ERISA has proven to be anything but an exact science." (citations omitted)); see
also discussion infra Part I.C.
68. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
69. Id. at 357. The court found that the plaintiff's claims "do not concern a denial of
benefits due or a denial of some other plan-created right" and therefore "bear no
significant resemblance to the claims described in § 502(a)(1)(B) [regarding claims for
benefits wrongfully denied]." Id. at 361; see also Lazorko v. Pa. Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 249-
50 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that plaintiff's allegation, that an HMO's financial disincentives
acted to discourage the hospitalization of a mentally ill woman, fell within the ambit of a
"quality of care" claim because the decision was made in the context of treatment).
70. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 352.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. Mrs. Dukes brought a suit against the HMO under the "agency theory," in
that the HMO's conduct made it apparent to the Dukes that the personnel treating Mr.
Dukes were employees of the HMO, even though they were not. Id. (citing Boyd v.
Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1234-35 (Pa. Super Ct. 1988) (applying agency
theory to hold HMO liable for malpractice)). She also brought a suit directly against the
HMO for its own negligence by employing incompetent personnel. Id.
74. Id. at 352-53.
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from a section 502(a) claim to recover benefits wrongfully denied.15 The
court, however, found that the plaintiff did not claim that their HMO
withheld benefits due to them, but rather complained "about the low
quality of the medical treatment that they actually received.,
76
In the Dukes case there was no indication that the participant's HMO
refused to pay for a treatment (the blood test), but rather it was the poor
decisions made on behalf of the medical personnel that caused the delay
in treatment. 77 In other words, as the court stated, "[A] claim about the
quality of a benefit received is not a claim under section 502(a)(1)(B).
78
Quality control, according to the Third Circuit, "is a field traditionally
occupied by state regulation and we interpret the silence of Congress as
reflecting an intent that it remain such.,
79
2. The Pegram "Treatment" and "Eligibility" Distinction
In Pegram v. Herdrich,8° the Supreme Court indicated another kind of
claim that fell outside ERISA's preemptive scope when it distinguished
among three kinds of health-related decisions that HMOs make during
the treatment process.81 First are "pure eligibility decisions" which "turn
on the plan's coverage of a particular condition or medical procedure for
its treatment. 8 2 For example, an HMO's decision whether to cover a
participant's treatment for appendicitis is an eligibility decision; the
HMO asks itself, is appendicitis a covered condition under our plan, or if
not explicitly covered, is it medically necessary?83 Such a decision is
fiduciary in nature and thus would fall within the scope of ERISA.
84
Second, HMOs, via the doctors they employ, may make "treatment
decisions" which involve choices about how a participant's condition will
75. Id. at 353, 356. The court in Dukes considered the fact that the plaintiff's
complaint was void of any allegation that the ER1SA-governed plan failed to provide
benefits due, i.e., the hospital that refused to conduct the blood test did not do so because
the HMO refused to pay. Id. at 356-57.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 357 ("Instead of claiming that the welfare plans in any way withheld some
quantum of plan benefits due, the plaintiffs . . . complain about the low quality of the
medical treatment they actually received .... ").
78. Id. The court went on to cite legislative history as being absent of an intent for
ERISA to govern quality of benefits received by plan participants. Id.
79. Id.
80. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
81. Id. at 227-29.
82. Id. at 228.
83. See id.
84. Id. An eligibility decision is analogous to a benefits determination, which is
fiduciary in nature. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2502 (2004); see also
supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing fiduciary responsibilities under
ERISA).
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be diagnosed and treated. An example of a treatment decision is
whether immediate action needs to be taken for an inflamed abdomen (a
signal of appendicitis). Pure treatment decisions are not governed by
ERISA as they are not fiduciary in nature. 7 The third kind of decision,
the subject of the lawsuit in Pegram, is the "mixed eligibility"
• - 88
determination. Examples of such determinations include decisions
involving the proper standard of care and the reasonableness of a
89proposed treatment.
Under Pegram, the Court noted that although "pure eligibility
decisions" fall within the scope of ERISA, the "mixed eligibility
decisions," like treatment decisions, are not fiduciary decisions under
ERISA and thus claims brought challenging these decisions are not
preempted by ERISA.9 ° The Court reasoned that to hold an HMO liable
for breach of fiduciary duty for their physicians' mixed eligibility
decisions would ultimately destroy HMOs.9 The Court further noted
that most decisions involve "mixed eligibility" determinations, and often
pure eligibility decisions cannot be untangled from decisions regarding
92
medical necessity.
Subsequently, lower courts used the Pegram distinction to uphold state
law causes of action, if such actions were based on "mixed eligibility and
treatment decisions."93
85. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 232. These decisions are not administrative, per se, and thus are not
fiduciary in nature. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2000); see supra note 35-36 and
accompanying text.
88. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 229-30.
89. Id. In Pegram, the Court listed the different types of decisions that fall into the
category of
mixed eligibility and treatment decisions: physicians' conclusions about when to
use diagnostic tests; about seeking consultations and making referrals to
physicians and facilities other than [HMO's]; about proper standards of care, the
experimental character of a proposed course of treatment, the reasonableness of
a certain treatment, and the emergency nature of a medical condition.
Id.
90. Id. at 237.
91. Id. at 232-34. "[T]hc Federal Judiciary would be acting contrary to the
congressional policy of allowing HMO organizations if it were to entertain an ERISA
fiduciary claim portending wholesale attacks on existing HMOs solely because of their
structure . I..." d. at 234.
92. Id. at 228-29.
93. See, e.g., Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 102 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that a state law
malpractice action is not preempted by ERISA since it is based on a "mixed eligibility and
treatment decision" challenging a flawed medical judgment), vacated sub noin. Vytra
Healthcare v. Cicio, 124 S. Ct. 2902 (2004); see also Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298,
308 (5th Cir. 2002) (upholding claims for breach of duty of ordinary care brought pursuant
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3. Procedural Regulations: Independent Medical Reviews Do Not
Conflict with ERISA's Remedial Scheme
Recent case law suggests that state laws mandating independent
medical review (IMR) of adverse benefit determinations are not
preempted by ERISA.94 In Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran,9 a patient
who was denied her request for a surgical procedure brought a state-
court action against her HMO under the Illinois HMO Act, which
provides participants and beneficiaries a right to an IMR for disputed
claims and mandates compliance with a reviewer's decision. 9
In Rush Prudential, the defendant removed the case to federal court,
claiming that ERISA preempted the plaintiff's action.97 Having granted
certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the law "relates to" ERISA plans
under section 514(a), thus placing the case in federal court.98 But the
Court went on to consider the savings clause, and determined that the
to a Texas state statute), rev'd sub noma. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488
(2004). However in Davila, the Supreme Court limited the scope of Pegram, noting that
Pegram is only implicated where the healthcare professionals who arc the subject of a suit
are either the treating physician or the employer of the treating physician. Davila, 124 S.
Ct. at 2502; see also discussion infra Part I.D.1.
94. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 359 (2002) (upholding
Illinois' independent medical review (IMR) law); Corp. Health Ins. v. Texas Dep't of Ins.,
314 F.3d 784, 786 (5th Cir. 2002) (upholding Texas' IMR law).
95. 536 U.S. 355.
96. Id. at 360-62. In the event of a dispute between a participant and an Illinois
HMO regarding the medical necessity of a benefit, the Act provides in pertinent part:
Each Health Maintenance Organization shall provide a mechanism for the timely
review by a physician holding the same class of license as the primary care
physician, who is unaffiliated with the Health Maintenance Organization, jointly
selected by the patient. . . , primary care physician and the Health Maintenance
Organization .... In the event that the reviewing physician determines the
covered service to be medically necessary, the Health Maintenance Organization
shall provide the covered service.
215 ILL. COMP. STAT ANN. 12514-10(a) (West 2002).
97. Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 362. After being denied her claim for a surgery with
an unaffiliated specialist, Moran sought independent review of her claim. Id. at 360-61.
Despite the review's finding that the surgery was medically necessary, Rush Prudential
again denied her claim. Id. at 362-63. The Illinois HMO Act provides that "[i]n the event
that the reviewing physician determines the covered service to be medically necessary,"
the HMO must cover the service. 125/4-10(a). In Moran's suit to enforce this provision of
the Act, the district court held that the Act was preempted by ERISA and denied Moran's
claim. Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 363. The Seventh Circuit reversed, and the Supreme
Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision. Id. at 363-64.
98. Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 364-65.
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law specifically "regulates insurance" and is therefore saved from
preemption under section 514(b)(2)(A). 99
The Rush Prudential Court further noted that the savings clause will
not save from complete preemption those state laws that conflict with
ERISA by providing for remedies in addition to those already provided
for in the statute.'00 Additional remedies conflict with the policy of
exclusive federal remedies embodied in ERISA. °'0 Laws providing for
additional remedies are preempted even if such laws regulate insurance
under the meaning of the savings clause.'02  However, the Court
ultimately found that the substantive provisions of the Illinois law do not
add to or conflict with remedies available under section 502(a), stating
that while the independent review procedure mandated by state law may
"settle the fate of a benefit claim," such a regulatory scheme does not
provide for any new cause of action or form of relief under state law.1
0 3
Thus the Court held that conflict preemption as set out by Pilot Life does
not apply where the substantive portion of the law does not conflict with
section 5 02 (a).1cv Therefore, the cause of action was subject to section
514 preemption, from which it was exempted under the savings clause. 5
99. Id. at 387. The savings clause states: "[Niothing in [§ 1144] shall be construed to
exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance,
banking, or securities." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000).
100. Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 377-79.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 377; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987) (holding
that ERISA's civil enforcement scheme is exclusive, and a state law suit challenging an
ERISA-governed plan for a denial of benefits will not be saved by the section
514(b)(2)(A) savings clause); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1987)
(holding that a state law tort claim for wrongful denial of benefits is within the scope of
ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), as an action arising under federal law). For a discussion of
complete preemption, see discussion supra Part I.A.1-B.
103. Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 379-80 ("[T]his case addresses a state regulatory
scheme that provides no new cause of action under state law and authorizes no new form
of ultimate relief.").
As of 2001, forty-two jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, have
enacted some form of external review legislation. KAREN POLLITZ ET AL., HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., ASSESSING STATE EXTERNAL REVIEW PROGRAMS AND THE
EFFECTS OF PENDING FEDERAL PATIENTS' RIGHTS LEGISLATION 1 (2002), available at
http://www.kff.org/insurance/externalreviewpart2rev.pdf. State IMR laws vary in several
respects, including scope, id. at 8, notice requirements, id. at 10, claims thresholds, id. at
13, whether a participant or beneficiary must exhaust internal plan appeals, id. at 12, and
whether the IMR decision is binding on the HMO, id. at 25.
Additionally, the revived Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 2004 (PBRA 2004)
contains a provision mandating the availability of independent external appeals
procedures. H.R. 4628, 108th Cong. § 104 (2004).
104. Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 380 ("[The procedure provided by § 4-10 does not
fall within Pilot Life's categorical preemption.").
105. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000).
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Similarly, in Corporate Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas Department of
Insurance,'°6 the Fifth Circuit found that a Texas law which permitted
participants and beneficiaries to seek review of managed care medical
necessity determinations did not conflict with ERISA's civil enforcement
provisions because it did not create or enlarge upon available remedies.10 7
Under Rush Prudential, a state law creating a right to independent
review "regulates insurance" under section 514(b)(2)(A), and such a law
ordinarily would be saved from preemption under the savings clause.
However, the law at issue in Corporate Health was challenged as applied
to self-funded ERISA plans and federal health plans. 1 9 As opposed to
an insured plan, a self-funded, or "self-insured" plan, is one where
benefits are paid through the employer-organization as opposed to being
paid by an insurance carrier. " ° Under the "deemer" clause, found within
the savings clause, a state cannot regulate self-funded plans as insurers."'
106. 314 F.3d 784 (5th Cir. 2002).
107. Id. at 786 (stating that there are no relevant differences between Texas law and
the Illinois law at issue in Rush Prudential).
108. Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 373-74, 380.
109. Corporate Health Ins., 314 F.3d at 786.
[T]he Court in [Rush Prudential] found, as did we with the Texas statute, that the
independent review provisions "related to" ERISA plans and were thus
generally preempted. [Rush Prudential] also notes that ERISA's savings clause
does not apply to self-funded ERISA plans. Therefore, ERISA forecloses
application of the Texas IRO provisions to self-funded ERISA plans.
Id. (footnote omitted).
110. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2004) (stating that "[a]n entity that
engages in a business, trade, or profession shall be deemed to have a self-insured plan if it
carries its own risk (whether by a failure to obtain insurance, or otherwise) in whole or in
part"); LAWRENCE & RUSSELL, supra note 43, at 53.
111. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990) (distinguishing between insured
and uninsured (self-funded) plans and holding that uninsured plans are not subject to state
insurance regulations); see also Bill Gray Enters. v. Gourley, 248 F.3d 206, 213-14 (3d Cir.
2001) (holding that state laws may not regulate uninsured, or "self-funded" health plans,
even if the self-funded plan purchases stop-loss insurance). The "deemer" clause states in
pertinent part: "Neither an employee benefit plan ... shall be deemed to be an insurance
company or other insurer . . . or to be engaged in the business of insurance . . . for
purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance
contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies." Id. at 213 (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B)). The Rush Prudential Court acknowledged the distinction
between self-funded and insured plans, stating that the Illinois law mandating IMR
"would not be 'saved' as an insurance law to the extent that it applied to self-funded
plans." 536 U.S. at 371 n.6; see also supra note 45 (discussing "deemer" clause in relation
to other clauses in section 514).
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D. The Davila Decision
1. Supreme Court Dismisses Plaintiffs' Claims Brought Under the
Texas Health Care Liability Act
During the summer of 2004, the Supreme Court halted states' attempts
to provide additional remedies to aggrieved health plan participants and
beneficiaries.' 2 In Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila," ' the Court held that
claims brought under the Texas Health Care Liability Act (THCLA)
were completely preempted by ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B). 1 4 The case
consolidated two different lawsuits arising under Texas law, one brought
by Ruby Calad, a beneficiary in a CIGNA plan, and the other by Juan
Davila, a participant in an Aenta health plan.1 5 Juan Davila's physician
prescribed Vioxx to treat his arthritis pain, but when Davila sought
pretreatment approval for the drug, Aetna refused to pay for it.16 He
instead took Naprosyn, had a severe reaction to the drug, and was
hospitalized.1 7 Ruby Calad's physician recommended an extended
hospital stay following her surgery; however, CIGNA refused to cover
this stay.118 Because of the denial, Calad left the hospital and, as a result,
suffered serious post-surgery complications.1 9 Both plaintiffs brought
112. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2498 (2004) (holding that claims
brought pursuant to a Texas law were completely preempted by ERISA). Eleven other
states have enacted laws similar to THCLA authorizing state lawsuits for damages, but
after Davila, these laws will be limited to public health plans or individual (non-employer-
based) health plans. PATRICIA A. BUTLER, VOL. V, NO. 2, ERISA UPDATE: THE
SUPREME COURT TEXAS DECISION AND OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2004),
available at http://statecoverage.net/pdf/issuebrief804.pdf.
113. 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).
114. Id. at 2502.
115. Id. at 2492-93. Two additional plaintiffs, Gwen Roark and Watter Thorn, were
also parties to the original litigation. See Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 302-04 (5th
Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004). Walter
Thorn's finger was amputated following injuries sustained in a car accident and his doctors
recommended follow-up surgery, indicating that without such surgery he would risk losing
his hand. Id. at 302. Although an Aetna specialist scheduled the surgery, Aetna decided it
would refuse the surgery until it had more time to review the claim. Id. Aetna ultimately
approved the surgery but only after some delay, and Thorn alleged that delay caused
scarring and subsequent loss of mobility. Id. Gwen Roark did not replead under section
502(a) when given the opportunity by the court and was thus not a party to the Supreme
Court case. Id. at 304; see also supra note 1.
116. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2493. The 2000 Department of Labor regulations draw a
distinction between postservice claims (requests for reimbursement after treatment has
been rendered) and preservice claims (requests for a benefit when plans condition receipt
of benefit on approval or precertification). See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(m)(2) (2004)
(preservice claim); id. § 2560.503-1(m)(3) (post-service claim).
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separate suits in state court under THCLA, which allowed tort claims for
negligence, and specifically for breach of the duty of ordinary care."'
The Supreme Court held that the "duty of ordinary care" imposed by
the Texas law did not arise independently of ERISA or the terms of the
plan in question. ' Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that although
the law arguably could be characterized as a law regulating insurance for
the purposes of the savings clause, state causes of action under THCLA
122fell "within the scope of" ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B).
Unlike Rush Prudential, where the dispute was over an HMO's refusal
to comply with a "regulatory scheme,"'23 the plaintiffs in Davila brought
a specific cause of action for benefits wrongfully denied, asserting rights
supplemental to those under ERISA section 502(a).124 The Illinois law at
issue in Rush Prudential mandated independent review in the event of a
dispute over medical necessity, but did not create any new cause of
action for wrongful denial of benefits. 25 In contrast, the Texas law at
issue in Davila purported to allow an action to recover damages for
injuries caused by an HMO's failure to exercise ordinary care in making/ • • 126
benefits determinations. The Court noted that allowing the action




121. Id. at 2497. The Court stated that the interpretation of the benefit plan's terms,
whether certain treatments are covered under the plan, was "an essential part of
[plaintiffs'] THCLA claim, and THCLA liability would exist here only because of [the
HMOs'] administration of ERISA-regulated benefit plans." Id. at 2498. Furthermore,
because the HMOs' liability derives from participants' rights with regard to the contract
between the HMO-administered plan and plan participant, which is regulated by ERISA,
the THCLA claims "are not entirely independent of the federally required contract itself."
Id.
122. Id. at 2498, 2500.
123. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355,379-80 (2002).
124. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2499-500.
125. Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 379-80; 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/4-10 (West
2000). The Rush Prudential Court implied that were the HMO still to refuse to comply
after the independent review determined medical necessity of a certain benefit, only then
would the plaintiffs be asserting a section 502(a) claim. See Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at
379-80.
126. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002 (Vernon 2004). The statute
provided that
(a) A health insurance carrier, health maintenance organization, or other
managed care entity for a health care plan has the duty to exercise ordinary care
when making health care treatment decisions and is liable for damages for harm
to an insured or enrollee proximately caused by its failure to exercise such
ordinary care.
Id.
127. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2498 n.4.
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The Davila Court also clarified the confusion surrounding the Pegram
"mixed eligibility" decisions. 12  The Court held that a benefits
determination is a fiduciary act, and "[tihe fact that a benefits
determination is infused with medical judgments does not alter this
result. 1. 9  In clarifying Pegram, the Court held that true "mixed
eligibility and treatment decisions" are those where medical necessity
decisions are made in the capacity of a participant's physician who is both
the treating physician and benefits administrator-meaning that the
reasoning employed in Pegram only applies to situations where medical
malpractice is alleged against a treating physician."' However, Davila
did not involve "mixed" treatment decisions, as there was no action on
the part of a CIGNA or Aetna physician.3 ' The plaintiffs' treatments
were prescribed by doctors who were independent from the HMOs, and
132
not fiduciaries of the plan . Because the benefits decisions made by
CIGNA and Aetna did not fit the mold of decisions made by both
physician and benefits administrator, the distinction in Pegram was not
implicated.1 3 3  The Court held that the plaintiffs' causes of action for
failure to exercise ordinary care were completely preempted by ERISA
section 502(a)(1)(B), and although they sought compensatory damages,
their recovery was limited to the cost of the benefits denied.
34
128. Id. at 2501. The plaintiffs in Davila relied upon the reasoning employed in
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000), in asserting that their claims are not preempted,
as their causes of action do not "relate to" an ERISA-governed employee benefit plan,
Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2500.
129. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2501. The Court went on to say: "[A]dministrators making
benefits determinations, even determinations based extensively on medical judgments, are
ordinarily acting as plan fiduciaries .... ." Id. at 2502.
130. Id. Thus, if an HMO review board, independent of a participant's treating
physician, makes a mixed decision, any challenge to the decision will be preempted. See
id. In Roark, holding that Calad's and Davila's HMOs were liable under THCLA, the
Fifth Circuit erroneously extended Pegram reasoning to Calad and Davila's claims seeking
to hold their HMOs directly liable for their "mixed eligibility and treatment decisions."
Id. at 2493 (citing Roark v. Humana, 307 F.3d 298, 307-08 (2002), rev'd sub nor. Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004)). In Pegram, the Court held that, because
they are not purely administrative (i.e., also involve medical judgments), such "mixed"
decisions made by a physician who is also a benefits administrator are not fiduciary in
nature. 530 U.S. at 229. But for the "mixed eligibility and treatment" label to apply, a
decision challenged must be a "truly" mixed decision-a decision made by the plaintiffs'
physician who is both the treating physician and the benefits administrator. Id.
131. See Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2496-97.
132. Id. at 2502. Thus, the challenged decisions were not truly "mixed eligibility and
treatment" decisions because they did not involve a physician acting as both a treating
physician and a plan administrator. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. The Eleventh Circuit applied Davila to strike down a plaintiff's negligence
claim against his HMO in Land v. CIGNA Healthcare of Florida, 381 F.3d 1274, 1275
(11th Cir. 2004). The patient in Land sought emergency room treatment when a cat-bite
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2. Justice Ginsburg's Concurrence and the "Regulatory Vacuum"
The injustice that flows from limiting aggrieved participants and
beneficiaries to ERISA's current menu of remedies has not gone
unnoticed by the courts, as evidenced by the many judges urging
congressional action or judicial reconsideration of the ERISA remedies
issue.135 Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Davila particularly merits
attention. A broad preemptive scope coupled with a "cramped
construction" of section 502(a)(3)'s equitable relief creates what has
been called a "regulatory vacuum" where participants and beneficiaries
are left with few remedies.136 Justice Ginsburg suggests two ways in
which this remedial void should be addressed. First, she invites
congressional action, acknowledging "'the rising judicial chorus urging
that Congress and [this] court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly
tangled ERISA regime."' 37 Next, she suggests that the Court reconsider
the issue of equitable relief and the availability of consequential damages
under section 502(a)(3). 3 8  Similarly, Justice Ginsburg cites to the
Government's Amicus brief, which recognizes another remedy that
aggrieved participants and beneficiaries may be able to pursue. 39 The
Government points out in note 13 of its brief that although the Court has
foreclosed an award of money damages as "equitable relief" under
wound became infected. Id. Despite his doctor's orders that he be hospitalized, a CIGNA
approval nurse determined that his infection was localized and he should be discharged.
Id. at 1275-76. Plaintiff's conditioned worsened until amputation became necessary and
Land filed a suit against CIGNA in state court alleging negligence, which was dismissed
pursuant to Davila. Id. at 1276.
135. See DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453-61 (3d Cir. 2003)
(Becker, J., concurring) ("ERISA has evolved into a shield that insulates HMOs from
liability for even the most egregious acts of dereliction committed against plan
beneficiaries, a state of affairs that I view as directly contrary to the intent of Congress.");
see also Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (Calabresi, J., dissenting in part)
("[Tihe injury that the courts have done to ERISA will not be healed until the Supreme
Court reconsiders the existence of consequential damages under the statute, or Congress
revisits the law to the same end."), vacated sub nom. Vytra Healthcare v. Cicio, 124 S. Ct.
2902 (2004).
136. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
137. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 453 (Becker, J.
concurring)).
138. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("[F]resh consideration of the availability of
consequential damages under § 502(a)(3) is plainly in order."). ERISA section 502(a)(3)
allows a participant or beneficiary to bring an action to recover "appropriate equitable
relief." 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3) (2000).
139. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2504 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 27 n.13, Davila (Nos. 02-1845, 03-83)).
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section 502(a)(3) in an action against a non-fiduciary, this approach has
not been tested in an action against a fiduciary.
3. Congressional Response and the Patients' Bill of Rights
On the same day that Davila was decided, Congress reintroduced a bill
that would amend ERISA by adding new protections for aggrieved
health plan participants and beneficiaries) 4 This bill, the Patients' Bill of
Rights Act of 2004 (PBRA 2004), sets forth requirements aimed at
strengthening internal utilization review and appeals procedures (claims
review procedures), 14' and in addition, creates a new right to external
appeal."-' The bill also would amend ERISA section 502 by adding a new
cause of action for failure to exercise ordinary care in providing health
benefits. 4 4 More significantly, PBRA 2004 would allow participants and
beneficiaries in ERISA-governed plans to recover economic and non-
economic damages.
145
140. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 27 n.13,
Davila (Nos. 02-1845, 03-83). Neither Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248 (1993),
nor Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002), involved
actions against a fiduciary, see id. at 207-08 (involving restitution action against plan
beneficiary brought by plan itself), Mertens, 508 U.S. at 249-51 (involving action against an
actuarial firm, an external service provider and not a plan fiduciary under ERISA). The
brief goes on to propose that although Mertens limited section 502(a)(3)'s "appropriate
equitable relief" to injunction, mandamus, and restitution, a "make whole" remedy against
a breaching fiduciary was historically available in equity. Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 27 n.13, Davila (Nos. 02-1845, 03-83); Mertens,
508 U.S. at 256.
141. Patients' Bill of Rights Act of 2004, H.R. 4628, 108th Cong. (2004). This bill was
originally introduced in 2001, and passed in the Senate but was defeated in the House. See
Bipartisan Patient Protection Act, S. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001).
142 See H.R. 4628, 108th Cong., §§ 102-103 (2004).
143. See id. § 104 (providing that a health plan provide participants with "access to an
independent external review for any denial of a claim for benefits").
144. See id. § 402(a).
145. See id. The new provision would read:
"(n) CAUSE OF ACTION RELATING TO PROVISION OF HEALTH BENEFITS.-
"(1) IN GENERAL.- In any case in which-
"(A) a person who is a fiduciary of a group health plan, a health insurance
issuer offering health insurance coverage in connection with the plan, or an agent
of the plan, issuer, or plan sponsor, upon consideration of a claim for benefits of
a participant or beneficiary ... or upon review of a denial of such a claim ... fails
to exercise ordinary care in making a decision-
"(i) regarding whether an item or service is covered under the
terms and conditions of the plan or coverage,
"(ii) regarding whether an individual is a participant or
beneficiary who is enrolled under the terms and conditions of the plan
or coverage (including the applicability of any waiting period under the
plan or coverage), or
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II. FILLING THE REGULATORY VACUUM: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The current ERISA framework as interpreted by the courts has left
health plan participants and beneficiaries with only a few options for
legal relief: injunction and reimbursement. 46 If a participant is denied a
benefit or treatment to which he believes he is entitled, he may seek an
injunction forcing the plan to pay for such benefit or treatment.'47
Alternatively, a participant may pay for the treatment himself and then
sue for reimbursement. The latter alternative is riskier and less
practical. The risk is that a court may find the treatment unnecessary
and deny reimbursement. The impracticality lies in the fact that many
Americans cannot afford to pay for costly medical treatment.
"(iii) as to the application of cost-sharing requirements or the
application of a specific exclusion or express limitation on the amount,
duration, or scope of coverage of items or services under the terms and
conditions of the plan or coverage, and
"(B) such failure is a proximate cause of personal injury to, or the death
of, the participant or beneficiary, such plan, plan sponsor, or issuer shall be liable
to the participant or beneficiary . . . for economic and non-economic damages
(but not exemplary or punitive damages) in connection with such personal injury
or death.
Id. The bill would allow aggrieved participants or beneficiaries to seek damages up to five
million dollars in federal court. Id. § 402(a)(1 ).
146. See DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 449 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating
that a plaintiff could seek an injunction under section 502(a) to enforce his right to
claimed benefits or could pay for the benefit himself, and subsequently seek
reimbursement).
147. See Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266. 273-74 (3d Cir. 2001)
(stating that had the plaintiff sought to accelerate U.S. Healthcare's approval of her
benefit claim, "she could have sought an injunction under § 502(a) ... thereby using the
provisions of the civil enforcement scheme provided by Congress"). Courts will issue
injunctions in favor of participants or beneficiaries who are seeking pretreatment
authorization for certain claims. See, e.g., Marro v. K-Il Communications Corp., 943 F.
Supp. 247, 248, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (claim for high dosage chemotherapy treatment);
Mattive v. Healthsource of Savannah, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1559, 1561 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (claim
for high dose chemotherapy); Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 132, 140
(D.N.J. 1989) (claim for bone marrow transplant treatment). However, although a
participant or beneficiary who is denied a benefit from their HMO may bring a suit for an
injunction against their HMO, few individuals have the financial means to do so. DiFelice,
346 F.3d. at 459 (Becker, J., concurring) ("[P]articipants ... are completely at the mercy of
HMOs unless they are fortunate enough to have the financial means to bring a suit for an
injunction, a circumstance which is no doubt exceptional.").
148. See DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 444, 449 (stating that the plaintiff who was seeking
coverage for a specially designed tracheostomy tube could have paid for the tube himself
and then sought reimbursement from his HMO). In Rush Prudential, plaintiff Debra
Moran, had surgery that her HMO deemed medically unnecessary, and thus did so at her
own expense. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 362 (2002). She sought
reimbursement from her HMO thereafter. Id.
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A. Federal Patients' Bill of Rights: Are Additional Remedies Necessary?
On many occasions, both the House and Senate have introduced
legislation that would provide more protections to health plan
participants and beneficiaries by way of increasing the liability of insurers
and HMOs. 14 The most recent patients' rights bill to be introduced in
Congress is the PBRA 2004.150 Legislators have taken different
approaches to creating a patients' bill of rights; some support bills that
both require external review procedures for contested benefits and
impose liability on HMOs and insurers who fail to exercise ordinary care
in their decisions,1' Another approach includes only mandatory external
review procedures, stopping short of creating a new cause of action for
participants and beneficiaries to pursue against their HMOs and
insurers."'
Supporters of a patients' bill of rights, like the PBRA 2004, that would
create a new cause of action against insurers and HMOs cite tragic cases
like Gwen Roark's as evidence that additional ERISA remedies are
149. See, e.g., H.R. 4628, 108th Cong. §§ 103(a), 104(a), 714(a), (b)(3)-(4),
402(a)(1)(n)(10) (2004); Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2004, S. 2083, 108th Cong.
§§ 103(a), 104(a), 714(a), (b)(3)-(4), 402(a)(1)(n)(1) (2004); Bipartisan Patient Protection
Act, S. 1052, 107th Cong. §§ 103(a), 104(a), (f)(3) (2001); Patients' Bill of Rights Act, H.R.
2990, 106th Cong. §§ 121(a), 503(a),(c)-(e) (1999); Patients' Bill of Rights Act, S. 326,
106th Cong. §§ 121(a), 503(a), (c)-(e) (1999); Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act, S. 300,
106th Cong. §§ 121(c), 503(a), (c)-(e) (1999); Patients' Bill of Rights Act, S. 6, 106th Cong.
§§ 131(a), 132(c), 133(a) (1999); Patients' Bill of Rights Act, S. H.R. 358, 106th Cong.
§§ 131(a), 132(c), 133(a) (1999); Patients' Bill of Rights Act, S. 240, 106th Cong. §§ 131(a),
132(a), 133(a) (1999); Access to Quality Care Act of 1999, H.R. 216, 106th Cong.
§§ 122(a), (d)-(e), 137 (1999).
150. See H.R. 4628, 108th Cong. (2004). This bill did not pass during the 108th
Congress.
151. E.g., id. § 502(n) (creating a new cause of action for participants and beneficiaries
via section 502(n), strengthening and streamlining internal claims reviews, and also
mandating an option to external independent review).
152. E.g., Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act, H.R. 2990, 106th Cong. (1999) (amending
ERISA to provide for a uniform internal appeals procedure and mandating that
participants and beneficiaries be granted a right to independent review of adverse
determinations); see also Access to Quality Care Act of 1999, H.R. 216, 106th Cong.
§ 122(a)-(b), (d) (1999); Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999,
H.R. 2723, 106th Cong. §§ 102(a)-(b), 103(a), 104(a) (1999). Unlike House Bill 2990,
House Bills 216 and 2723 proposed to amend ERISA's preemption provision, section 514,
to read that ERISA preemption would not apply to state law causes of action for personal
injury and wrongful death in connection with the provision of insurance or medical
benefits in group health plans. H.R. 216, 106th Cong. § 302(a) (1999); H.R. 2723, 106th
Cong. § 302(a) (1999). One Third Circuit justice has advocated the solution proposed in
House Bill 2723 as being "promising," because in allowing state law causes of action to
escape ERISA preemption, participants could recover compensatory damages. DiFelice
v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442,465 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring).
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needed to redress such horrific injuries.' They believe that the threat of
liability may deter health plan misconduct.-
4
Those opposed to expanding HMO and insurer liability argue that
patients' rights legislation will only encourage litigation by driving up
costs that will ultimately be passed onto participants and beneficiaries or
alternatively, will motivate an employer to drop their health plan
altogether.'5  Others argue that a federal patients' bill of rights fails to
address the real shortcomings in managed care,'56 and legislators
advocating a patients' bill of rights are relying on nothing more than
153. ERISA, the Foundation of Employee Heath Coverage: Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of the Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce,
107th Cong. 13-14, 16-17 (2001) [hereinafter ERISA Hearing] (statement of Alice Weiss,
Director of Health Policy, National Partnership for Women & Families). In advocating
for passage of a federal patients' bill of rights, Ms. Weiss states in her written testimony
that
[r]eal people are hurt by the absence of meaningful accountability. There
are too many examples of those who are left without redress after the tragic
results of a health plan's decision to delay or deny care. The parents who lost
their baby after the health plan refused to authorize round-the-clock hospital
monitoring .... The man who committed suicide after his health plan denied
him admission to a health plan's alcohol rehabilitation program.... These are
the real faces behind the need for health plans to be accountable for their
decisions.
Id. at 86-87. This hearing was held before House Bill 4628 was introduced but concerns a
virtually identical bill.
154. BUTLER, supra note 112, at 3 (stating that the "threat of liability for economic
damages for needed additional medical care, pain, and suffering and punitive damages for
,outrageous' health plan actions" will curb misconduct). Health plans express contrary
opinions, stating that litigation to recover economic and punitive damages will increase
insurance premiums by disrupting utilization review procedures. Id. However, before
Davila, few suits to recover such damages were actually brought under the then-existing
state managed care liability laws. Id.
155. ERISA Hearing, supra note 153, at 10-11 (statement of James A. Klein, President,
American Benefits Council) (stating that a patients' bill of rights "encourages litigation
instead of the expeditious resolution of honest disputes and exposes employer sponsors
and health plans to the reality of enormous ... financial penalties"). Republicans in the
House and Senate also voice concern that creating a new cause of action that allows
participants to hold their HMOs liable will have the effect of creating more litigation,
which in turn will cause insurance premiums to rise. William M. Welsh, Democrats Renew
Push for Patient Bill of Rights: Legislation Bogged Down on Specifics, USA TODAY, June
22, 2004, at 7B. Some legislators, such as Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.),
are concerned that increased lawsuits will impede efforts to help uninsured. Id. However,
some health plans do not see increased liability as posing a huge threat to their business,
indicating that such liability concerns may be speculative at best. See Agrawal & Hall,
supra note 24, at 239. Yet other health plans see the threat of increased liability as very
real. Id. at 240 (quoting one health plan representative as saying it "'only takes one big
case to put you out of business"').
156. Hyman, Managed Care, supra note 23, at 244.
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anecdotal evidence to support the bill's necessity.'57 Indeed, Gwen
Roark's story was used as such anecdotal evidence at a 2001 House
committee hearing on a Patient's Rights bill.'58 While her story does
strike an emotional chord, it remains unclear whether Gwen's interests
would have been best served by an independent external review of her
claim for VAC treatment, or an opportunity to sue her HMO for money
damages. James Klein, a witness at the 2001 hearing, would agree with
the former remedy, that Gwen's best interests would have been served
by "[r]esol[ution] of these issues upfront, rather than the cold comfort of
a huge damage award that comes after the fact and after the tragic
amputation of a leg." 59
One must also consider the effect that a new remedy would have on
Congress' intended balance between "the need for prompt and fair
claims settlement" and "the public interest in encouraging the formation
of employee benefit plans," which supports a limited set of remedies.'
6
In Pilot Life, the Court cited this balance when it preempted state-
created remedies, making note of the "deliberate care with which
ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were drafted and the balancing
policies embodied in its choice of remedies.' 6' A new remedy that
would allow recovery in excess of what is already provided in ERISA's
civil enforcement provisions would disrupt the balance outlined by the
Supreme Court, regardless of whether the remedy is state or federal in
nature. 62  Such a remedy may weigh against the public interest of
encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans.'63
157. ld. at 236 ("Legislators tend to identify 'necessary reforms' on the basis of bad
anecdotes and popular appeal, but that strategy is hardly a recipe for sensible public
policies.").
158. ERISA Hearing, supra note 153, at 16-17.
159. Id. at 22 (statement of James A. Klein, President, American Benefits Council).
160. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987); see discussion supra Part
I.B.
161. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54.
162. Id.
163. DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 455-56 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker,
J., concurring) (suggesting that if states were able to supplement ERISA's regulations as
they pleased, some employers would cease to offer employee welfare benefit plans
because of the difficulty in tailoring plans to different jurisdictions). Indeed, ERISA does
not require that an employer provide its employees with health benefits, Shaw v. Delta
Airlines, Inc. 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983), but only regulates those organizations that establish
employee welfare benefit plans as defined in § 1002, H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 5 (1973),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,4643.
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B. Judicial Reinterpretation
1. Wiping the Slate Clean: Reconsidering Section 502(a) (3)
In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,64 the Supreme Court held that the
language of ERISA section 502(a)(3), which allows a participant to bring
a suit for "appropriate equitable relief," does not authorize a suit for
compensatory damages.' Justice Scalia, the author of the five-to-four
majority opinion, based this conclusion on his assertion that money
damages were not a remedy typically available in courts of equity16 and,
therefore, were not "equitable relief.'
1 7
But there is a sizeable contingent, which includes other Supreme Court
justices, that disagree with Justice Scalia's interpretation and support the
notion that "appropriate equitable relief" does in fact include
compensatory damages. 16  Justice Ginsburg expressed doubt that
Congress focused on the distinction between actions in law and equity at
the time they were drafting ERISA's civil enforcement provisions.1
69
Indeed, by 1974 when President Gerald Ford signed ERISA into law,
almost forty years had passed since the courts of law and equity
merged.' 70  In Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Davila, she cites the
need for "fresh consideration of the availability of consequential
164. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
165. Id. at 255-56.
166. Id. Justice Scalia is referring to the judiciary as divided into courts of law and
courts of equity. Id. at 256. The "divided bench" merged with the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534
U.S. 204, 224-25 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
167. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255-56 ("'[E]quitable relief' can also refer to those categories
of relief that were typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and
restitution, but not compensatory damages)."). Justice Scalia's interpretation of
"equitable relief" limited the term to mean injunction, mandamus, and restitution. Id. In
Knudson, the Supreme Court further limited the relief available under section 502(a)(3) to
exclude actions in restitution that seek to impose personal liability on the defendant. 534
U.S. at 213-14; see also supra note 40.
168. E.g., Mertens, 508 U.S. at 266 (White, J., dissenting) ("The traditional 'equitable
remedies' available to a trust beneficiary included compensatory damages."); Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 27 n.13, Aetna Healthcare Inc.
v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004) (Nos. 02-1845, 03-83) ("[T]he government has taken the
position ... that Section 502(a)(3) allows at least some forms of 'make-whole' relief
against a breaching fiduciary in light of the general availability of such relief in equity at
the time of the divided bench."); John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable":
The Supreme Court's Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1317, 1352 (2003) ("An award of money damages ... is also a classic form of
equitable relief.").
169. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 224 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that historical
distinctions between actions in law and suits in equity "were hardly at the fingertips of
those who enacted § 502(a)(3)").
170. Id. at 224-25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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damages under § 502(a)(3),' 7' and with only a five-to-four majority
favoring Justice Scalia's interpretation, this may be a viable remedy that
an aggrieved participant may pursue in seeking monetary
compensation.72
2. Who and What Was ERISA Intended to Regulate?
As the title suggests, ERISA, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act, was enacted by Congress with the intent to regulate
retirement plans taking the form of pensions.'73 Indeed, ERISA was
enacted in response to the pension plan abuses that were prevalent at
• 174
that time. Although the title refers to pension plans, ERISA's
introductory text is less specific, stating the legislative purpose as
"protect[ing] . ..the interests of participants in employee benefit plans
171. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
172. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 249. Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas
joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion and Justices White, Rehnquist, Stevens, and
O'Connor dissented. Id.
173. Introductory remarks of Mr. Ribicoff, supra note 28.
[T]oday I am joining in the introduction of S. 4, legislation to reform America's
outmoded private pension system.
All too often working men and women contribute to these pension plans
only to find when they retire that the benefits they had been promised are denied
them.
In addition, frequently the pension funds themselves are abused by those
responsible for their management who manipulate them for their own purposes
or make poor investments with them.
It is time controls were imposed to safeguard the workers' valuable funds.
Genuine pension reform will be achieved only by Federal regulation.
The pension reform legislation being introduced today attempts to bring
orderly regulation to a field now fraught with insecurity for the working man.
Id.; see also Jennings et al., supra note 28.
174. See Introductory Remarks of Mr. Ribicoff, supra note 28.
[A]buses and phantom retirement security benefits have been frequent....
[M]isuse, manipulation, and poor management of pension trust funds are all
too frequent. One financially ailing company tried to borrow over a million
dollars from a subsidiary's pension pool for use as operating capital. Another
company has a policy of investing more than half its pension fund's assets in the
company's own common stock and in real estate of a company subsidiary. And
yet another firm routinely dips into its pension funds for cash to make
acquisitions.
These manipulations point up the lack of real controls over the investment of
pension funds.
Id. at 207-08. The long title of ERISA as originally introduced in the Senate was "To
Strengthen and Improve the Protection and Interests of Participants and Beneficiaries of
Employee Pension and Welfare Benefit Plans." S. 4, 93d Cong. (1973).
1068
ERISA Preemption and Patients' Rights
and their beneficiaries.' 7  Some argue that ERISA was never intended
to regulate healthcare benefits.' 76  However, the addition of several
sections to ERISA that govern health insurance suggests that while
Congress initially did not intend ERISA to cover health benefits, its
purpose has evolved to include them.
17
Russell Korobkin, a commentator on managed care jurisprudence,
argues that medical benefits from managed care organizations (MCOs),
which include HMOs, are not ERISA plan benefits under the meaning of
the term "employee benefit plan.' ' 1 8  Pilot Life held that ERISA
preempts actions not only against plans, but also against insurers and
HMOs when an employer, as part of his health plan, purchases insurance
or membership in an HMO."7 9 Pegram was the first case to address the
issue of whether benefits provided through the employer via an HMO
constituted an ERISA-governed plan, and answered in the affirmative.8
But Korobkin argues that although a membership with an MCO may be
a plan benefit offered from employer to employee, a health service
provided (or not provided) by the MCO is not an employee benefit.""
Logically, therefore, a suit by a participant against the MCO for failure
to provide a benefit is not a suit over an ERISA plan benefit, and thus is
not preempted by section 502(a)(1)(B).ln
While Korobkin may well point out a "failed jurisprudence" on the
part of the Supreme Court, there is scant dissent among the Supreme
Court justices over the notion that HMOs fall within the ambit of an
ERISA-governed "employee benefit plan."'' 3  Therefore, without a
175. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000) (emphasis added).
176. ERISA Hearing, supra note 153, at 80 ("ERISA was never intended to regulate
health insurance.").
177. See supra note 31.
178. Korobkin, supra note 18, at 470-73.
179. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986).
180. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 223 (2000) (holding that health benefits
administered by an HMO are ERISA plan benefits, and an HMO acting in this capacity is
an ERISA fiduciary).
181. Korobkin supra note 18, at 485 (stating that there is a "fundamental difference
between what the employer promises to an employee and what a third-party contractor
promises to an employee").
182. Id. The author also states that because of the distinction between services
promised by an employer and those promised by a third-party, a lawsuit against an MCO
does not "relate to" an ERISA-governed plan and would therefore withstand ERISA
preemption. Id.
183. Pegram, the only Supreme Court decision to expressly touch on the issue of
whether an HMO delivering benefits was governed by ERISA section 502, was a
unanimous decision. 530 U.S. at 214. Additionally in Pilot Life, the Supreme Court
unanimously held that ERISA precludes common law causes of action against insurers.
481 U.S. at 43.
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major departure from ERISA jurisprudence, this argument may not be
viable in a court of law and promises no immediate relief for an
aggrieved participant.
III. WORKING WITHIN THE ERISA FRAMEWORK: THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT SHOULD PASS LEGISLATION PROVIDING PATIENTS WITH
A RIGHT TO IMR
IMR mandates are a viable and practical solution to the injustice
resulting from ERISA's limited remedial scheme, and a federal law
mandating IMR would provide the much needed rights for participants
and beneficiaries in a way that (1) does not conflict with ERISA's
exclusive remedial scheme,' 4 and (2) would prevent or reduce the
number of many serious injuries that often result from a denial or a delay
in benefits.
85
A. ]MR Is Consistent with ERISA 's Exclusive Remedial Scheme
In Rush Prudential, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that
states may pass health insurance-related legislation mandating IMR
procedures, and that this legislation would escape ERISA preemption. 8 6
The Court held that state laws mandating IMRs will not be preempted
provided that the independent review scheme "provides no new cause of
action. ',1 7  As of 2001, forty-two states, including the District of
Columbia, had enacted IMR laws, providing health plan participants and
beneficiaries in their states with a right to an independent appeal of an
adverse benefits determination. 88  Since 2001, North Carolina has
184. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 379 (2002) (holding that the
independent external review scheme "provides no new cause of action under state law and
authorizes no new form of ultimate relief").
185. See POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 103, at v-vi (finding that in forty-five percent of
state-mandated independent external reviews, the review board overturns the decision of
the insurer in favor of the participant).
186. Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 385.
187. Id. at 379-80.
188. ALASKA STAT. § 21.07.050 (Michie 2002); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2537
(West 2002); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.33-.34 (West 2000); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10-16-113.5 (West 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-478n (West 2000);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9119 (2003); D.C. CODE ANN. § 44-301.07 (2001); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 641.51(4) (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-32 (2000); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 432E-6 (Michie 2004); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/4-10 (West 2000); IND.
CODE ANN. § 27-8-29-1 to -12 (1999 & Supp. 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 514J.1-.15 (West
Supp. 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-22a13 to -22a16 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 304.17A-623 (Michie Supp. 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:3081-3087 (West 2004);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4312 (West 2000); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-10A-05
(2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1760, § 14 (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 550.1911 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62Q.73 (West 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT.
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followed this trend and enacted a law allowing participants and
beneficiaries to seek external review.189
B. Independent Review Reduces the Number of Injuries that Result from
Denials or Delays in Treatment
Under the independent external review procedure proposed in the
PBRA 2004, Gwen Roark would have received a decision on coverage
within seventy-two hours. 9 ° Under the PBRA 2004, the determination of
the independent medical review is binding on the plan or HMO.' 9 A
Kaiser Family Foundation Report found that under state laws that
mandate IMR, almost half of appeals that go to IMR are decided in favorof th . • 92
of the participant. This means that the insurer or HMO's decision that
§ 376.1387 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-37-102 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 420-J:5-e (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2S-11 (West Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-
57-4.1 (Michie Supp. 2003); N.Y. INS. LAW § 4904 (McKinney 2000); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3923.67 (2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2528.3 (West 2004); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 743.857 (2003); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 991.2162 (West 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-
17.12-10 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-71-2010 (Law. Co-op. 2002); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 56-32-227 (2000); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 843.261 (Vernon 2004); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
art. 21.58A, § 6 (b)-(c) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-629
(2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089f (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5902 (Michie 2002);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.43.535 (West Supp. 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25C-6
(Michie 2003); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 632.835 (West 2004).
189. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-50-75 (2003). As of the date of this Comment, the
following states have not enacted laws mandating independent review mechanisms:
Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota,
and Wyoming. As of 2003, Nevada statutory law provides for a limited right to external
review, allowing a participant in a health plan to seek external review when his plan has
failed to render a decision in the time frame provided for by statute, and allows a
participant and his physician to request external review after exhausting the internal
appeals process. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 695G.241,695G.251 (Michie 2003).
190. H.R. 4628, 108th Cong. § 104(e)(1)(A)(ii) (2004). We can assume that Gwen
Roark's claim would be entitled to expedited determination, as her doctor indicated that
any delay in treatment could result in the loss of her limb. Roark v. Humana Inc., 307
F.3d 298, 303 (2002), rev'd sub nom. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).
Under a non-expedited determination, Gwen would have received a decision within
twenty-one days of submitting her appeal. H.R. 4628, 108th Cong. § 104(e)(I)(A)(i)
(2004).
191. H.R. 4628, 108th Cong. § 104(d) (2004); see infra note 212 (comparing Illinois
HMO Act, chapter 215, act 125, section 4-10 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes, with House
Bill 4628).
192. POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 103, at v (stating that, on average, forty-five percent
of cases result in the independent reviewer overturning the decision of the insurer or
HMO, and in six percent of the cases, the insurer's or HMO's decisions are modified in
some way).
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a treatment or procedure was medically unnecessary was overruled by
the IMR almost fifty percent of the time.9
Presumably, if an HMO anticipates that its decision may be second-
guessed when it denies a benefit based on a lack of medical necessity or
the experimental nature of treatment, the HMO will most likely be more
careful in making its coverage determinations. 1 4  Unlike the internal
review procedure, in which the HMO's concern for limiting benefit
awards in the interest of cost-containment is factored into the coverage
decision,'95 the independent reviewer is not influenced by the same cost-
control concerns and thus presumably would have no incentive to limit
benefits awarded.
196
Some authors criticize past attempts by Congress to include a right to
IMR in federal legislation. 97 Since it is necessary for a participant to first
exhaust internal appeals procedures before bringing their claim to an
independent review board,' 98 patients often do not have the time to
engage in a lengthy appeals process.' 99 Federal legislation, however,
could avert this problem by regulating and streamlining the internal
appeals procedure .
C. Patients' Rights to an Independent Medical Review Should Be
Federalized
Despite the almost nation-wide recognition of a patient's right to
independent medical review, 9' action needs to be taken on a federal level
193. See generally id. In all but three jurisdictions granting a statutory right to external
review (District of Columbia, Oklahoma, and Oregon), the decisions of the independent
reviews are binding on the HMO or insurer. Id. at 25.
194. See H.R. 4628, 108th Cong. § 104(d)(2) (2004).
195. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 219-20 (2000); Korobkin, supra note 18, at 462-
64; see also text accompanying notes 18-20.
196. See, e.g., H.R. 4628, 108th Cong. § 104(d)(3)(E) (2004) (providing in pertinent
part that "[i]n making determinations under this section, a qualified external review entity
and an independent medical reviewer shall ... consider the claim under review without
deference to the determinations made by the plan or issuer").
197. E.g., Judge Joyce Krutick Craig, Managed Care Grievance Procedures: The
Dilemma and the Cure, 21 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 336, 393-98 (2001)
(discussing patients' rights legislation from the 103rd to the 106th Congresses).
198. TRUDY LIEBERMAN ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & CONSUMERS
UNION, A CONSUMER GUIDE TO HANDLING DISPUTES WITH YOUR EMPLOYER OR
PRIVATE HEALTH PLAN 2 (2003), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/health/
hmo-review/ExtReview.pdf.
199. Craig, supra note 197, at 398.
200. Such changes may be done by amending or enacting new Department of Labor
regulations, see 29 U.S.C. § 1135 (2000), and do not require congressional action or
statutory amendment.
201. See discussion supra Part IlIlA, notes 188-189 and accompanying text.
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due to two very important shortcomings in state legislation. First, state
laws do not reach self-insured health plans . 2 This means that a state law
creating a participant's right to independent review, which "relates to" an
ERISA plan, cannot be imposed upon a self-insured health plan because
ERISA's savings clause does not apply to such plans .2 " Approximately
forty-seven percent of all employees with group health coverage are
enrollees of a self-insured employer health plan 0 4 For these people to
benefit from independent review, a federal law mandating such reviews
must be enacted.
A second problem with state-mandated IMR is the lack of uniformity
in notice requirements.2 5 A lack of meaningful notice may be linked to
the low numbers of health plan participants and beneficiaries who
actually exercise their IMR right.206 A majority of states that mandate an
IMR require that a health plan provide its enrollees with notice of their
rights to IMR in the enrollment materials and handbooks. But, there
208
are no guarantees that consumers read these materials. All states
require that notice of the right to IMR be provided to insureds in a letter
denying participants and beneficiaries request for coverage, although
many states do not require such notice until the final letter of denial after
the final stage of the internal appeal. 2°9  A federal law could bring
202. E.g., Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 314 F.3d 784, 786 (2002)
("[Slelf-funded ERISA plans are not covered by ERISA's savings clause . .
203. Id.
204. POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 103, at v.
205. Id. at 10.
206. Id. at 8, 10. The number of IMR cases in states providing a right to independent
review is "strikingly low" compared to the number of insured. Id. at 3. A lengthy and
often difficult internal appeals process is also cited as hindering participation in IMRs, as
most states require a participant to exhaust their plan's internal appeals process before
exercising their right to IMR. Id. at 5, 7.
207. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 44-301.03(c) (2001) (providing that at the time of
enrollment, the insurer must provide to the enrollee written notice of the components of
the grievance system, which includes a right to contact the Director of the District of
Columbia's Department of Health if the issuer's internal grievance system produces an
unsatisfactory result). Every state with IMR laws except Georgia and Kansas require
notice in either a health plan's enrollment information or member handbook. POLLITZ ET
AL., supra note 103, at 10 exhibit 5. For a discussion of the different notice requirements
within each state that provides for IMR, see id.
208. POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 103, at 10.
209. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-10D-02(a)-(f) (2002 & Supp. 2004). Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia also have similar laws. POLLITZ ET
AL., supra note 103, at 10, exhibit 5 (discussing how states that mandate a right to IMR
also require notice of a right to IMR).
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uniformity to this notice scheme and would assure that participants and
beneficiaries receive the information necessary to fully exercise their
rights to IMR.20
Recent versions of federal legislation addressing the issue of patients'
rights have incorporated independent external review mandates.2 1 ' For
example, the IMR provided for in the PBRA 2004 resembles the Illinois
law which the court upheld in Rush Prudential.21 2 Although the PBRA
2004 does provide for an external appeal mechanism, the bill's inclusion
of a new statutory cause of action for compensatory relief keeps the bill
mired in congressional conflict.2'3 It is therefore unlikely that the bill will
214pass in its current form. Therefore, in order to give health plan
participants and beneficiaries meaningful and immediate protection,
Congress should rework the PBRA 2004 to exclude provisions enacting
additional civil remedies, and focus on providing participants and
beneficiaries with a fair and expedient appeals procedure via IMR.
210. E.g., H.R. 4628, 108th Cong. § 121(a)-(c) (2004). The proposed Patients' Bill of
Rights, House Bill 4628, sets forth uniform notice requirements, providing that enrollees
must be provided notice of their right to an external appeal: (1) at the initial enrollment
period and (2) again annually, and (3) upon request for such information. Id. § 121(a)-(b).
In addition, enrollees can request information about the success rate of external appeals
under their plan. Id. § 121(c).
211. Leatrice Berman-Sandler, Independent Medical Review: Expanding Legal
Remedies To Achieve Managed Care Accountability, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 233, 293-94
(2004).
212. Compare 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/4-10 (West 2000) (providing that each
HMO shall provide an independent review procedure to be conducted by a physician
jointly selected by the patient, the primary care physician and the HMO, and making the
coverage decision of the review binding on the HMO), with H.R. 4628, 108th Cong. § 104
(2004) (mandating that group health plans and health insurance issuers offering health
insurance coverage provide their participants and beneficiaries with access to an
independent medical review to appeal adverse benefit determinations based on the
medical necessity of a service, experimental nature of a treatment, and other medically
reviewable decisions).
213. See Welsh, supra note 155 (stating that Democrats and Republicans cannot agree
on issues such as limits on money damages and whether plaintiffs may sue their HMO in
state courts). Democrats advocate a cause of action that would allow plaintiffs to sue their
HMOs in state courts, which are known to award higher damages than federal courts. Id.
Republicans seek to limit money damages and confine the lawsuits to federal courts. Id.;
see also Editorial, HMOs Win, Patients Lose and Congress Stays in Coma, USA TODAY,
June 22, 2004, at 12A (citing disagreement over whether to limit damage awards and
whether lawsuits should be heard in state or federal court as forestalling any congressional
action on a patients' bill of rights).
214. Welsh, supra note 155 (quoting a spokesman for Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist
(R-Tenn.) as saying action on House Bill 4628 was unlikely to pass in the 108th Congress).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Immediate measures must be taken to protect health plan participants
and beneficiaries from the potentially life-threatening decisions of their
HMOs. 215 The Supreme Court, on numerous occasions and most recently
216in Davila, has expressly invited Congress to take action on this issue.
Almost all of the states have enacted laws implementing independent
medical review procedures consistent with the guidelines of Rush
Prudential, but federal regulation is needed. It is now Congress' turn to
be a pioneer-to enact legislation that will fill the regulatory vacuum,
and to do so without conflicting with ERISA's purpose and scope. By
enacting a federal Patients' Bill of Rights that gives patients a right to
external appeal procedures, Congress will be protecting participants and
beneficiaries' interests in their own well-being against the competing
interests of the health insurance industry of cost-containment and profit.
This option, because it does not conflict with ERISA's remedial scheme,
does not represent a major departure from ERISA jurisprudence.
Additionally, this option will eliminate much of the opposition for a
patients' bill of rights, as many oppose not the independent review, but
the additional remedies.
215. DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 467 (3d Cir. 2003) (Bercker, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he vital thing... is that either Congress or the Court act quickly, because
the current situation is plainly untenable.").
216. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 2503 (2004) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) ("I also join the rising judicial chorus urging that Congress ... revisit what is
an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA regime.").
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